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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
Lykes Bros.,3 5 that a statute which permits a seaman to recover two days'
pay for each day's wages withheld does not impose a penalty. The statute there
involved, however, specifically declares the extra compensation to be "recoverable
a wages." 3 6 Cardozo, J., although recognizing this language to be decisive
of the case, went on to observe that "delay (in payment of wages to a seaman)
means loss of opportunity to ship upon another vessel. It means hardship during
the term of waiting, the sufferer often improvident, and stranded far from
home. ' 3 7 Such a loss was difficult of measurement and Congress had therefore
fixed upon the formula of double wages to insure adequate compensation.38
Again, the conclusion of the court was supported by statutory language and a
reasonable relationship between the loss suffered and the recovery permitted.
If Section 205-a provides no such language and if recovery of a sum exceeding proven damages is possible, on what basis did the Court of Appeals decide
in the Sicolo case that the purpose of the act was to provide compensation and
not punishment? The court explained only that "It is the intrinsic nature of the
exaction that counts and a Section 205-a suit is essentially one for compensation
to a person injured through a defendant's fault." 39 It is submitted that the
question is not so much one of the "intrinsic nature of the exaction" as it is one
of the appropriateness of the length of time during which the injured fireman
should be allowed to bring suit against the regulation violator. The court
admitted that under Gannon v. Royal Property,4o "a Section 205-a suit is
(quasi-penal' since in one sense the recovery 'penalizes' the violator of a
safety law. But the Gannon case had nothing to do with the statute of limitations applicable to such suits." 41 Perhaps the question before the Court of
Appeals in the Sicolo case might be phrased, "Is it unreasonable for a prospective defendant to have the possibility of a Section 205-a suit hanging over his
head for six years rather than for three years?" The court found that it was not.
NOTICE REQUIRED IN DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR SUPPORT PAYMENT ARREARS

Section 1171-b of the New York Civil Practice Act states that "Where
the husband in an action for divorce, separation, annulment, or declaration of
nullity of a void marriage . . . makes default in paying any sum of money

as required by the judgment or order directing the payment thereof, the court
in its discretion may make an order directing the entry of judgment for the
amount of such arrears ...

; the application for such order shall be upon such

notice to the husband or other person as the court may direct."
In 1950, respondent, who was appellant's wife, secured a judgment for
an annulment wherein the appellant was directed to make weekly support pay35. 237 N.Y. 376, 143 N.E. 226 (1924).
36. 38 STAT. 1164, 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1915).
37. Supra note 35 at 379, 227.
38. Ibid.
39. Supra note 20 at 258, 184 N.Y.S.2d 100, 103.
40. Gannon v. Royal Properties, 285 A.D. 131, 136 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1st Dep't 1954),
aff'd 309 N.Y. 819, 130 N.E.2d 616 (1955).
41. Supra note 20 at 258, 103.
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ments for their son. Seven years later she instituted proceedings pursuant to
Section 1171-b by way of a show cause order, seeking money judgment against
the former husband for the arrears due.
The judge signed the show cause order, directing notice of the application
to be served upon defendant or his attorney. Service was effected on the
defendant's attorney of record in the annulment action, who submitted an
affidavit in partial opposition urging that he no longer represented defendant,
and asked to relieved of all further responsibility. After an adverse decision
and before entry of an order thereon, the attorney moved for reargument and
communicated with the defendant who lived out of state. Another attorney
who had represented the defendant in another matter appeared in chambers in
relation to the motion for reargument under the guise of being from the first
attorney's office. An order was granted entering judgment in favor of the wife.
4
In an appeal from this order, the Court of Appeals in Haskell v. Haskell
held that Special Term had the power to find that the husband was duly
represented by counsel and that no service of new process was necessary to acquire jurisdiction over the husband's person. Two concurring judges would
grant leave to defendant to apply at Special Term to move for leave to interpose
any defense that he might have on the merits.
In an application under Section 1171-b, it may be assumed that the
court will direct that the service shall be made in a manner in keeping with
the particular circumstances which may be involved. 43 As this motion was
merely another means for the effective enforcement of the support provisions
of an annulment decree, no additional personal service of original process was
necessary. 44 The parties, by virtue of the annulment decree, remained subject
to the continuing jurisdiction of the court as to all ancillary matters,4 so that
the motion is one in the action.
Although personal notice is dispensed with, the manner of notice which
the court directs should be such as to give a defendant an opportunity to be
heard.46 It has been held to be sufficient, if the person directed to be served
be one through whom it is likely that the defendant will obtain adequate notice
of the application. 47 In the instant case, the defendant was apprised of the
action being taken against him and chose not to exercise his right to contest.
In allowing a default to be entered, he was not deprived of his day in court.
Haskell v. Haskell48 may be characterized as a case in which the particular
fact situation fitted into the confines of settled law.
42. 6 N.Y.2d 79, 188 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1959).
43. Muller v. Muller, 184 Misc. 587, 54 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Thus in
IleJongh v. DeJongh, 13 Misc.2d 882, 177 N.Y.S.2d 53 (Sup. Ct. 1958), service of notice

was by registered mail directed to defendant at his out-of-state address as well as to his
employer which was a New York corporation.
44.
45.
46.

Ageloff v. Ageloff, 207 Misc. 804, 140 N.Y.S.2d 424 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
Fox v. Fox, 263 N.Y. 68, 188 N.E. 160 (1933).
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1945).

47. Muller v. Muller, supra note 2.
48. Supra note 42.

